TEHRAN – To assess the current trajectory of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran as of March 2026, it is essential to analyze how the involved parties have arrived at their present positions.

In the 12-day war in June 2025, the Israeli Air Force conducted most of the attacks, and approximately 1,500 projectiles were used against Iran throughout the conflict.

During the first 48 hours of that war, significant damage was inflicted on Iran. However, the failure of the enemy to exploit internal divisions within Iran, combined with the operational exhaustion of the Israeli Air Force—exacerbated by long-range missions, fuel shortages, and the depletion of its target list—significantly constrained Israel’s strategic options.

Additionally, the premature exposure of Israel’s military strategies within the first two days of the conflict, paired with a surge in Iranian missile strikes, forced Tel Aviv to rely on direct Washington’s direct involvement for a targeted strike on the Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities.

Notably, while the United States had long prepared for such an operation—Israel’s reliance on American backing underscored the shifting balance of power and the eventual call for a ceasefire.

After the end of the war, Israeli planners apparently concluded that in a larger campaign, they could not attack alone, so serious consultations at various levels began to involve the United States directly in the attacks. These consultations and planning efforts encompassed comprehensive interagency coordination across political, military, and intelligence spheres.

There were multiple different plans on how to wage a new war against Iran, but ultimately Tel Aviv succeeded in directly involving the United States in a joint campaign.

The Pentagon's plan

Based on several reports and satellite images, we can conclude that the Pentagon decided to allocate the capability of around 400 fighter jets to operate against Iran.

To execute the operation, approximately 50 fighter jets deployed from the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier were tasked with targeting southern Iran, while an additional 300 fighter jets based in the Middle East and Europe, alongside around 50 aircraft from the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier, joined the effort.

Complementing this aerial assault, cruise missiles and drones were integrated into the strategy, creating a coordinated aerial and missile strike formation designed to overwhelm Iranian defenses from multiple directions.

American and Israeli military planners must have calculated that after the initial wave of attacks, Iran would initiate missile strikes on Israel and spend hundreds of missiles in each wave, but they would be able to defend against missile barrages.

Simultaneously, they thought that the Iranian offensive power could be quickly suppressed.

They distributed their fighter jets to various bases in the region: the UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as airbases and an airport in Israel. They also used other bases in Iraq and Bahrain for other purposes in their aggression.

Iran's counteroffensive plan

Iranian military planners, anticipating this plan and monitoring the logistics movements of the United States and Israel, decided to implement three strategies:

I. Authorization for independent fire: Anticipating the enemy's plan to kill senior commanders, members of the Supreme National Security Council, and the Defense Council in the initial moments, it was decided to pre-determine plans and target banks and hand them over to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps' offensive units across Iran, so that as soon as the aggression began, the missile firings would start.

This caused a situation where, unlike the 12-day war, where Iran's first missile firing occurred 16 hours after the start of the Israeli strikes, this time the response began just one hour after the attack on Tehran.

II. Dispersing missile units: Previously, Iran's missile bases were limited to main bases, which the enemy aimed to destroy to suppress Iran's fire.

However, this time, in addition to increasing adherence to defense principles and creating additional defensive fortifications to strengthen defense, the launching sites were also increased and dispersed across the country.

As a result, we see that despite the enemy's stronger and more numerous attacks on Iran's bases, ballistic missile strikes and drone attacks have continued, albeit in smaller numbers. Therefore, Iran's attritional pressure is continuously maintained.

III. Despite the continuous missile strikes against Israel from the very beginning, the main counteroffensive power has focused on American bases in the region from the very first moment, as well as managing the Strait of Hormuz.

The initial goal was to destroy the enemy's radar and defense capabilities by dismantling their early warning network and reducing the operational effectiveness of the American military in the region.

Iranian commanders knew that over time, the enemy would inevitably launch a massive fire on Iranian bases, so it was important for Iran to deliver more powerful blows with fewer firings.

In this way, the enemy was caught off guard by the implementation of this plan at this scale and intensity.

The destruction of the main radars in American bases in the region, which had previously provided significant assistance to Israel in defense and preparedness during operations True Promise 1, 2, and 3, not only reduced the operational capacity of their bases or pushed them out of the region, but also reversed the previous plan.

Instead of tightening the operational rings, the United States was forced to mostly rely on airbases in Israel and Europe, which would require lengthy and numerous aerial refueling for each operation. Thus, Israel once again became the main center of aerial operations.

The entry of the resistance forces of Iraq and Lebanon further consumed another part of the air power of Israel and the United States, so that during Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon, Israel was forced to use its navy aggressively more and more.

Once again, similar to the 12-day war, the exhaustion and operational pressure on the Israeli Air Force increased.

These factors, along with the renewed limitation and depletion of the enemy's target bank, made them resort to alternative mechanisms, as their operational rhythm was clearly affected, which is evident.

At the same time as these developments on the battlefield and in the military sphere, the political atmosphere in the United States also tilted against the aggressors and warmongers, especially due to the pressure that Iran's management of the strategic Strait of Hormuz had on the global and American economies.

 'Other fronts'

Additionally, Iran has cards that it has not yet used. On Monday, March 15, the first use of the long-range Sejjil ballistic missile was announced, and it can be expected that Iran will use more of its new and advanced missiles as the world witnesses the increasing weakness of Israel's and American air defense.

The message of the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, in addition to clearly emphasizing the use of the "lever of blocking the Strait of Hormuz," referred to Iran's future cards and surprises in this way: "Studies have been conducted regarding the opening of other fronts where the enemy has minimal experience and will be highly vulnerable."

Additionally, Yemen's Ansarullah, which pre-war reports indicated had prepared for military action, has maintained its readiness and is prepared to enter the war in support of Iran and the resistance front in scenarios such as severe escalation by the enemy in the Persian Gulf, the direct entry of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in an attack on Iran, an attack on Ansarullah, or a different offensive use of the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier by the United States.

But now that their other options have proven ineffective, a leverage of the White House is the threat to target Iran's infrastructure.

A threat that, of course, has faced explicit and clear warnings from Iran; opening the front of infrastructure would give Iran's hand for more powerful blows and would once again shift the red lines in Iran's favor.

The number of facilities and infrastructure considered part of American interests is far greater than Iran's infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. These highly vulnerable infrastructures are considered the lifeline of the American financial capitalist system, and can be targeted in self-defense by Iran's armed forces.